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Architecture is obviously connected to ethics in a multitude of ways. 
Some include: that buildings must possess what Vitruvius called 
firmitas – solidity, firmness or solidity1 – lest they will collapse 
and kill their inhabitants or, at least, injure them; that buildings 
must be made honestly – the builder must not cheat his/her cli-
ents by employing cheaper materials than the contract calls for; 
the architect should treat his workers fairly – he/she should not 
endanger their lives, should pay them a living wage, not employ 
slave labor etc.; the architect should not design unhealthy spaces 
and, in general, should not be complicit in immoral projects. These 
are all negative moral obligations. But architecture is also beholden 
to ethics by way of promoting the good. Architects should do no 
harm. But they should also contribute to better living.
Nevertheless, it would appear that the architect can meet all 
these negative obligations and provide benefits as well solely by 
way of material construction and respect for the ethical norms 
governing material construction. In other words, the aforesaid 
ethical concerns can be met by building pure and simple. They do 
not appear to require the exercise of architecture as a fine art – that 
is, architecture as a practice with an aesthetic dimension.
Vitruvius defined architecture as having the properties of firmitas 
(solidity), utilitas (function or use) and venustas (the properties of 
Venus, like beauty, grace or, as currently interpreted, appearance 
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or looks – as in “good” looks).2 As we have seen firmitas has a 
straightforward connection to ethics. Likewise, utilitas is related 
to ethics insofar as those functions should be at least not evil and, 
it is to be hoped, sometimes conducive to social goodness. But what 
about venustas? What connection, if any, does it have to ethics? 
That is the question of what relation, if any, does architectural 
aesthetics or architecture-as-a-fine-art have to morality.
Throughout history in the West, at least up until the eighteenth 
century, architecture maintained a lofty status in the hierarchy of 
the arts. The pyramids, the Parthenon, the Colosseum, Roman 
roads and aqueducts were wonders of the ancient world, while the 
cathedrals of the Middle Ages were probably the greatest artistic 
achievements of those times in Europe, only to be outshined by the 
splendors of Renaissance architecture.
But during the eighteenth century, architecture came under 
siege. Its prestige was undermined conceptually.
What happened? As is well known among aestheticians, was 
the formation of what Paul Oskar Kristeller called “The Modern 
System of the Arts”3 – also known as The Beaux Arts. This involved 
the segregation of poetry, drama, painting, sculpture, music and 
dance from the manual arts and crafts. However, this conceptual 
categorization or grouping required a rationale. What made 
portraiture a fine art whereas decorating saddles with paint was 
merely a craft? Several rationales or principles emerged. And none 
of them were favorable to the status of architecture as a fine art.
The first proposal, proffered by Abbé Batteux, was that some-
thing is a work of fine art only if it is an imitation of the beautiful 
in nature.4 This stipulation boded ill for architecture, since most 
architecture is not an imitation of anything. Some, of course, is, 
like the bird-shaped library of the University of Toronto. But this 
is a glaring exception.
Batteux’s conception of the fine arts soon gave way to another 
due, in all probability, to the appearance and rise in influence of 
absolute or pure orchestral music. The symphonies of Haydn, 
Mozart, and Beethoven had to be accommodated conceptually. But 
their symphonies clearly were not really imitations of anything, 
least of all anything in nature.
The immediate solution to the problem was to subtract “im-
itation” from the criterion of “the imitation of the beautiful in 
nature.” That left us with “the beautiful.” Thus, the fine arts were 
taken to be the arts of beauty – once again, The Beaux Arts.
But how to understand beauty?
Perhaps the most influential account was Kant’s notion of free 
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beauty or pure beauty in his Critique of the Power of Judgment.5 
As is well known, this account amounted to the beauty being 
construed as the disinterested pleasure arising from the contem-
plation of forms of purposiveness without a purpose. Kant himself 
commented upon the consequence of this for architecture; he said 
that it could not afford an experience of pure beauty where such 
experiences were categorically divorced from purposes, including, 
with particular relevance to our discussion, moral purposes.
Subsequent commentators, undoubtedly misinterpreting Kant, 
took his account of free beauty as the defining ingredient of art, 
articulating this viewpoint in theories such as that of art-for-art’s 
sake, of aestheticism, and eventually formalism. As a first ap-
proximation, these theories maintained that an artwork was some-
thing with the function of promoting experiences of free beauty. 
However, as it became obvious (as it already was to Kant), that 
that sort of beauty was too narrow a concept to cover the pertinent 
phenomena, the patent was extended under the label “aesthetic 
experience.” On this new conception, an artwork is something 
with the function of promoting or affording aesthetic experience 
which, in turn, is generally understood as an experience valued 
for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else – that is, not 
for its utilitarian, moral, political, religious, social or otherwise 
putatively extrinsic purposes.
If it is true that the ascendency of absolute music forced this 
theoretical realignment, then perhaps that explains Walter Pater’s 
famous assertion that “All art constantly aspires to the condition of 
music,” where the music in question is pure music.
On this view of fine art, architecture could only be admitted 
into the circle of the muses in virtue of venustas – its appearance. 
Hence Venturi defined architecture-as-an-art as “a decorated 
shed.”6 Architecture was to be prized in terms of its formal proper-
ties, like “harmony” à la Corbusier. This approach to architecture- 
as-an-art was probably already abroad in the early nineteenth 
century, as witnessed by Goethe who maintained alternatively 
that “Architecture is music become stone” or that “Architecture is 
frozen music.”
By the mid-twentieth century, some of the more extravagant 
claims of aestheticism were tempered by what we can call the 
aesthetic theory of art which, on Monroe Beardsley’s version of it, 
maintains that something is an artwork just in case it is made with 
the primary intention of affording some magnitude of aesthetic 
experience where aesthetic experience is still thought to exclude 
utilitarian purposes, moral purposes, cognitive purposes and so on. 
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Although Beardsley parts company with formalists like Clive Bell, 
he still claims that art is an autonomous realm of practice, one 
whose function is the affordance of aesthetic experience which, 
again, is defined as distinct from the kinds of experiences promoted 
by other practices such as religion, politics, sports, philosophy and 
morality. 
Anticipating somewhat and perhaps needless to say, the very 
notion of artistic autonomy ill suits an irreducibly heteronomous 
practice like architecture.
Artistic autonomism comes in two forms: radical autonomism 
and moderate autonomism. Radical autonomism claims that art-
works properly so-called have nothing whatsoever to do with any-
thing other than the promotion of aesthetic experiences. However, 
radical autonomism is too radical. Most of what is historically 
regarded as art, such as religious art, had purposes other than the 
promotion of aesthetic experience, even if it is conceded that the 
promotion of aesthetic experience was among its various purposes. 
Alternatively, a moderate autonomist like Beardsley hedged 
his definition of art, requiring that artworks merely permit the 
affordance of aesthetic experience as a primary motivating inten-
tion. This allows that the work may have been made with other 
intentions, including religious ones. This sort of allowance gives 
rise to one version of what we can call moderate autonomism. 
On this view, artworks may have properties other than aesthetic 
properties – i.e., properties that give rise to aesthetic experiences 
– but the aesthetic dimension of the putative artwork is always 
categorically discreet from the other dimensions of the artwork, 
whether they be utilitarian, moral, religious, political, cognitive, 
and so forth.
Operationally this is taken to entail that, for example, a moral 
defect in an artwork is never an aesthetic defect nor does a moral 
virtue in an artwork ever add to the aesthetic quality of the art-
work, properly so-called.
To see how this applies to a para-architectural artwork, recall the 
ancient story of the Brazen Bull of the tyrant Phalaris of Akragas, 
Sicily. Phalaris is reputed to have had constructed a Bronze Bull in 
which he had criminals executed. In effect, the bull was a giant 
pressure cooker in which the miscreants were roasted over an 
intense but slow burning fire. Supposedly the brazier was so 
constructed that the moans and screams of the immolating pris-
oners were transformed into allegedly beautiful harmonies by the 
apertures in the structure. Listeners were beguiled by the sonorous 
sounds emitted by the Brazen Bull. Nor, allegedly, were the sounds 
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experienced as any less dulcet when the listeners learnt how the 
sounds were produced – which by anyone’s understanding should 
be regarded as a form of cruel and unusual punishment. And, I sup-
pose that even Phalaris would agree to this. After all that is what 
he designed it to be.
The moderate autonomist would concur that the Brazen Bull 
is an atrocity – a brutal torture chamber – and, to that extent, that 
it can be charged legitimately with moral defectiveness. But 
nevertheless, that moral defectiveness, the moderate autonomist 
argues, does not accrue any aesthetic demerits. The bull is bad, but 
beautiful. The moral judgment of it and the aesthetic judgment of it 
are necessarily, categorically twain. The artwork as an engine of 
moral retribution is evil and can be condemned as such. But the art-
work-qua-art – in terms of moderate autonomism as parsed by the 
lights of the aesthetic theory of art – is a success, an artistic success.
Returning to Venturi’s notion that architecture is a decorated 
shed, the “shed” half of the formula pertains to realizing all the 
functions of architecture that are not aesthetic – i.e., not devoted to 
affording aesthetic experience. The adjective “decorated” can be 
read as an abbreviation for the affordance of aesthetic experience. 
A structure is only a case of fine art in virtue of the latter. And it is 
only valuable qua architectural art insofar as it is decorated. If it has 
defects as a shed – if the roof leaks as do many of Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s buildings – that does not count as an aesthetic defect – as a 
defect qua artwork – because from the perspective of moderate auton-
omism, a utilitarian defect never counts as an art-architectural defect.
Of course, moderate autonomism is not only concerned to 
insulate the artwork from charges of utilitarian defectiveness. 
From our point of view, we are particularly interested in its claim 
to insulate the architectural artwork qua artwork from criticism 
that would count a moral defect in the artwork as an artistic defect.
So the issue at hand is whether moderate autonomism is true 
with respect to architecture. This is at least the claim that: with 
respect to architecture-as-an-art, a moral defect will never count as 
an art-architectural defect (where for current purposes, an artistic 
defect is to be understood in terms of the aesthetic theory of art).
Against moderate autonomism with respect to architectural art, 
I wish to promote moderate moralism7 which, against moderate 
autonomism’s “never,” maintains that sometimes a moral defect in 
an artwork, including a work of architectural art, will count as an 
artistic defect, even understood in terms of the aesthetic theory of art.
My form of moralism is moderate insofar as it only holds 
that this is sometimes the case and not always the case.8 But if it is 
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sometimes the case, that should be sufficient to defeat moderate 
autonomism, which claims that it is never the case.
The argument for moderate moralism begins by noting that art-
works have functions or purposes including promoting aesthetic 
experiences, but not only that. Furthermore, it is the task of the 
artist to articulate or embody or implement those purposes in a 
manner or form that facilitates those purposes or that is adequate 
to or suitable or appropriate to those purposes. That is what artistry 
ideally amounts to – choosing the ways in which, from an array 
of options, the goals of the artwork are realized most adequately.
In other words, the artist is committed to finding the form 
suited to the purpose of the work. The form, on this view, is the 
selection of choices intended to realize the purpose or purposes 
of the work. Form here should be conceived in the model of the 
human form – the form of the work is the way or ways in which the 
purpose or purposes of the work are embodied.
Furthermore, artworks, including architectural artworks, can 
have among their purposes engendering emotional responses. For 
example, with respect to architectural artworks, typically Catholic 
cathedrals aim at eliciting awe by means of their vast, vaulting 
inner spaces.
Moreover, many emotions have a moral component as anger 
requires the belief that an injustice has been perpetrated against 
me or mine or as pity requires that the victim of misfortune be 
perceived to be undeserving.
Thus, attempting to engender a certain emotional response to an 
artwork may involve securing a contributory moral appraisal, or, 
at least, not provoking a moral appraisal contrary to the intended 
emotional response.
For example, as Aristotle points out, for the tragic emotion to 
take hold, the audience must not take the protagonist’s suffering 
to be blameworthy, that is, a result of his moral defectiveness. In 
other words, the tragic character has to be designed in a certain way 
that is appropriate to the purpose of arousing the tragic emotion. 
Seen this way, the character is one of the design elements of 
a tragedy – he/she is constructed from an array of choices in such 
a way that the final selection is ideally suited to achieving the pur-
pose of the tragedy, namely, engendering pity and fear. Thus, the 
design of the character is a formal choice – a choice of the way the 
purpose of the work is to be embodied or articulated. Moreover, 
the character’s design will need to possess certain moral elements 
if the character is to function properly and, in addition, it must not 
involve countervailing moral attributes.
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But if this is correct, it opens the possibility that a formal feature 
of a work may be defective as an artistic choice, because it is morally 
defective.
For example, the choice of an evil tyrant like Phalaris as the 
subject of a tragedy in which he is destroyed because of some morally 
blameworthy act of his own – perhaps he slips into the Brazen Bull 
and is burnt alive, while trying to push Mother Teresa into the 
blistering cauldron – would emotionally block the tragic response of 
pity and instead probably raise joy in our hearts due to the thought 
that justice had been served. But in any event, such a choice would 
defeat the emotional purpose of tragedy, rendering the form of the 
work defective, in consequence of its moral blemish, and, therefore, 
unable to deliver the intended aesthetic experience.
Given the conception of form as the choices that embody 
the purposes of a work, the choice of Phalaris, as he is typically 
portrayed, as a tragic protagonist would be a formal defect where 
form is a paradigmatic object of aesthetic experience. But it is also 
a moral defect involving a defective moral judgment on the part of 
the author in supposing that a catastrophe befalling a moral monster 
like Phalaris in the course of an evil act could be an appropriate 
object of pity. Thus, it is a defective formal choice inasmuch as it 
involves a defective moral judgment as a constitutive element, one 
that the audience is invited to share, but which it resists. And this 
formal/moral feature of the imagined work blocks the possibility 
of its affording an aesthetic experience of its form. 
My point here, which is often overlooked, is that designing cer-
tain artworks requires making moral judgments and when those 
judgments are defective, the design-qua-design is flawed and, to 
that extent, undermined as an object of aesthetic experience.
Thus, in the case of Phalaris: The Tragedy, a moral defect in 
an artwork is a formal defect; an ethical flaw is an aesthetic flaw; 
a moral demerit counts as an aesthetic demerit. Therefore, moderate 
autonomism is false.
Now, the argument so far – and the thought experiment mar-
shaled to support them – involves a narrative representation with 
characters. Can anything like it be mount for a non-narrative art-
work, such as a work of architectural art? I think that the answer is 
“yes,” just because architectural artworks, like narrative artworks, 
can be predicated upon the goal of engendering emotions, as in the 
case of Catholic cathedrals that are intended to provoke awe in the 
parishioners.
So in honor of the United States presidential election of 2016, 
let us imagine that Donald Trump won the election. Taking aim at 
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his love of gold, humorists already have imagined that his first order 
of business would be to have the White House gold plated. Let us go 
them one better. Let us imagine that once he is elected, President 
Trump decides to build a new presidential residence, a veritable 
palace, a golden palace. 
Putatively, the purpose of this palace is to elicit admiration.
As typically understood, this sort of admiration should be free 
of moral blemish. However, it seems to me that many will be unable 
to admire Trump’s golden palace just because it would involve 
waste. Some may bridle at its vulgarity. But far more, I conjecture, 
will be disgusted, morally disgusted, by its excessive wastefulness. 
Moreover, moral disgust will defeat the aim of engendering ad-
miration. Admiration here fails to be secured because the formal 
choice of articulating its appeal by means of tons and tons of gold 
is a morally inappropriate way to engender the pertinent sort of ad-
miration, indeed, it is a way of generally canceling the probability 
of that response by arousing audience resistance to it. Thus, this 
case will have the same consequences for moderate autonomism 
as the case of Phalaris: The Tragedy.
It is important to see the difference between the case of Trump’s 
golden palace and the seemingly comparable one where a new 
building is criticized morally because it has too large a carbon 
footprint. Presumably in the latter case, this criticism raises no 
aesthetic complications because the carbon footprint is not part 
of the artistic address of the building. But in the case of Trump’s 
presidential palace, the choice of gold is part of the emotional 
address. That is, unlike having a large carbon footprint, the choice 
of gold is an integral part of the artistic design of the work. Thus, 
due to its moral significance, it compromises the aesthetic address 
of the palace qua artwork in a way that a large carbon footprint 
would not, even though it may independently raise ethical hackles.
One objection to my extension of the argument for moderate 
moralism from the narrative arts to architecture is that it would not 
have traction in a possible world slightly different from our own 
where gold is far more plentiful and where Trump’s presidential 
palace would not constitute waste. However, I maintain that moral 
argument must be constrained by the world as we find it. The case 
against murder could not be made in a world where humans were 
invulnerable. Moreover, if the world were different and gold was 
widely abundant, our imagined President Trump would not have 
chosen it as a way of commanding admiration.
Another objection is that the gold in question as a formal dimen-
sion of the palace and its moral valence are distinct. This strikes 
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me as false once we notice that it is a formal property of the palace 
because of its intended contribution to achieving the palace’s aim 
of currying admiration, where that emotional aim requires that the 
gold as a formal choice not be undermined by its negative moral 
valence. Where an emotion like admiration is involved, moral 
value will be constitutive of the adequacy (or the lack thereof) of 
the formal choice.9 
To make a formal choice in the context of designing a work 
to elicit certain emotional responses frequently requires making 
a moral judgment about the ethical appropriateness of the choice 
and, if the moral judgment is defective, the formal choice to which 
it contributes essentially will also be simultaneously defective. To 
claim otherwise without showing what is wrong about this argu-
ment in terms of moral address is to beg the question in favor of 
moderate autonomism and against moderate moralism. It is simply 
to assert the truth of moderate autonomism, whereas I maintain that 
the kind of argument that I have just offered, which has been called 
the “uptake argument,” shifts the burden of proof to the moderate 
autonomists not only with regard to the narrative arts but with 
regard to architecture as well. 
My strategy so far has been to accept the terms of engagement 
of the moderate autonomist and to meet the challenge of showing 
how a moral defect could count as a formal defect in order to 
demonstrate that there is a connection between ethics, on the one 
hand, and the aesthetics and art of architecture, on the other hand. 
I think that the uptake argument can illustrate how this can be done.
But in addition I think that the connection along some dimen-
sions between the aesthetics and ethics can be grounded easily 
within certain familiar conceptions of architecture. As mentioned 
earlier, Vitruvius maintained that architecture has three dimen-
sions: firmitas (materiality), utilitas (function) and venustas (beau-
ty – or, in more contemporary language, appearance or form). On 
the argument for moderate moralism that I have just offered, one 
of the functions of architecture is to elicit certain emotions, and 
the form or appearance of the building can be an indispensable 
means to achieving those ends. Sometimes moral considerations 
will figure in the success or failure of engaging the intended emo-
tions. Consequently, sometimes moral considerations play a role 
in evaluating the achievement of architecture qua architecture in 
Vitruvian terms.10
One alternative view of architecture might be Venturi’s – that 
architecture is a decorated shed. The “shed” here signals that 
architecture has materiality and serves a function. “Decoration” 
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is treated as an independent component. This understanding 
implies that what is distinctive of the work of architecture – that 
is, that which distinguishes architecture from mere building – is 
decoration, understood as visual artistry, either as in the case of 
John Ruskin who thought of the work of architecture as the deco-
ration of the surface of the structure, or, as in the work of various 
contemporary architects, like Frank Gehry, who by the grace of 
computer design, create buildings that are veritable visual specta-
cles, sometimes referred to as bordering on sculpture. 
However, if architecture as art is conceived of as simply the 
visual aspect of architecture, one worries that this might involve 
committing what aestheticians of the natural environment, like 
Allen Carlson, think of as the “pictorial fallacy” – the mistake of 
treating a landscape as if it were a landscape painting. 
If the art of architecture were essentially visual art, the work of 
the architect would be complete once she produces a sufficiently 
interesting architectural drawing. But such a conception of the art 
of architecture is nothing short of a reductio ad absurdam if taken 
as the standard view of what the art of architecture is.
On the standard view of architecture, the material, functional, 
and formal dimensions of building must be integrated; they must 
work together in concert and mutually constrain each other. 
And this entails that sometimes in pursuit of certain purposes, 
especially ones pertaining to emotional address, the form of the 
architectural artwork, as an object of aesthetic attention, will be 
constrained constitutively by morality. Or to put it in a Vitruvian 
idiom: where the function of a work of architectural art is to elicit 
certain emotional responses, the appearance or form of the work 
needs to serve the function in a morally appropriate or suitable way.11
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